1. Introduction {#sec1}
===============

The *Coronavirus*, from *Betacoronavirus* sub-genus, was first isolated in the city of Wuhan (China), in December 2019, from a patients' cluster presenting a not recognizable acute pneumonia, whose affected had the only common denominator the visit at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market (Wuhan, China) ([@bib23]). Since COVID-19 spread in China, reported cases in the world kept on increasing in the majority of the industrialised countries in the world ([@bib17]). The *Coronaviridae* family, enveloped RNA single-stranded viruses of positive polarity (e.g., species of human *Coronavirus*, HCoV), are generally responsible of a wide range of common flus and infections of the upper respiratory tract. H--CoV are involved in severe pathologies, such as bronchitis, bronchilotis, pneumoniae, mainly affecting neonates, children, old people and immunocompromised patients ([@bib13]). The transmission of disease connected to SARS-CoV-2 infections is associated to the contact with infected persons through the emission of droplets ([@bib32]). Although there are no scientific evidences regarding the transmission of the new *Coronavirus* through water, wastewater, food or other matrices, it can be hypothesised that the virus is inactivated more rapidly than non-enveloped (therefore, less virulent) viruses, holding the same route of transmission (e.g., *Adenovirus*, *Norovirus*, *Rotavirus*, Hepatitis A virus). High temperatures, low or high pH values, sunlight, and the most common disinfection agents represent an essential tool able to inactivate the virus. Based on the experimental data available today, it is not clear how long the virus is capable of surviving on inanimate surfaces, neither in the environment.

2. Analysis {#sec2}
===========

The analysis of the potential transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 in the environment, enhancing the spreading of COVID-19 outbreaks, is necessary, because of the virus extreme contagiousness showed in the first months of the emergence.

2.1. Persistance of SARS-CoV-2 on surfaces, food and environmental matrices {#sec2.1}
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The majority of available studies concerning the presistance of *Coronavirus* species in animated environments and surfaces were conducted on a surrogate human *Coronavirus* strain, HCoV-229E ([@bib18]; [@bib37]): on different surfaces of various materials, such as plastic, metal, or glass, the virus is able to survive from 2 h to 9 days. Temperatures ranging from 30 °C to 40 °C are able to substantially reduce the persistance of highly pathogenic viruses, such as the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome *Coronavirus* (MERS-CoV), the Transmissible Gastroenteritis Virus (TGEV) and the Mouse Hepatitis Virus (MHV). A higher viral load of SARS-CoV is capable to survive for longer time. The same study demonstrated, using carrier tests, that the HCoV-229E is effectively inactivated in 1 min on stainless steel, employing the most common biocides, such as ethanol 70% w/v or 0.1% sodium hypochlorite ([@bib18]; [@bib37]). Studies aimed to verify the survival of SARS-CoV, sharing high phylogenetic similarities with SARS-CoV-2 ([@bib11]), showed the survival of a 10^5^ viral titre of the pathogen on aluminium, plastic, metal, wood, and paper, of 4--5 days at room temperature ([@bib18]). The main results of the researches conducted on SARS-CoV-2 surrogate strains (SARS-CoV, and H--CoV-229) are showed in [Table 3](#tbl3){ref-type="table"}. The COVID-19 is caused by SARS-CoV-2: recent researches supposed that the probable ecological reservoirs could be the bats, which allegedly transmitted the virus to humans through an intermediate host. Based on previous epidemics from the past 20 years, caused by species from *Coronavirus* genus, such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and the Middle East respiratory Syndrome (MERS), cases of viral infection transmission through food were never registered, and, until now, no SARS-CoV-2 infections transmitted via food were reported: studies in progress aim to evaluate the mode and time of survival of the virus in food matrices. For examples, it has been demonstrated that, at 4 °C, MERS-CoV is able to survive up to 72 h in food ([@bib39]). A study conducted in 2013 regarding the survival of human *Coronavirus* 229E (H--CoV 229E) in different food matrices (fruit and vegetables) describes the lower persistance of the virus on lettuce stored at 4 °C, compared to *Poliovirus* 1 (PV-1). In particular, H--CoV 229E on lettuce registered a log~10~ reduction \>1.31 after 8 days, with respects to the 0.36 log~10~ reduction of *Poliovirus* 1. H--CoV 229E was not detectable on lettuce samples after 4 days of storage and no viral loads were detected after spiking H--CoV 229E on strawberries samples ([@bib40]). It is needed to specify that the starting viral loads from the 3 pathogens were different: in fact the overall recovery of H--CoV 229E on lettuce, at the time of virus spiking, resulted lower (3.99 ± 0.25 log~10~), compared to *Poliovirus* 1 (7.14 ± 0.10 log~10~) and *Adenovirus* 2 (9.15 ± 0.19 log~10~) ([@bib40]). It may be therefore possible that the faster die-off of H--CoV 229E could be linked to the lower viral load, in spite of *Poliovirus* 1 *Adenovirus* 2, whose loads were respectively 3 and 5 log~10~ higher. The recent evidences regarding monitorings conducted on further *Coronavirus* strains demonstrate that, although these pathogens result stable at low temperatures for a defined period of time, the application of the proper measures to ensure food hygiene and safety are able to prevent the virus shedding. In particular, species from *Coronavirus* genus are thermolabile, thus susceptible to traditional heat treatments (e.g., 70 °C cooking): it would be indeed sufficient avoiding to consume uncooked food of animal origin. It is furthermore important to underline that SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV in general are extremely susceptible to detergency and disinfecting treatments, and there are not evidences showing higher resistance of SARS-CoV-2 ([@bib39]), allowing to consider appropriate the periodic cleaning of surfaces, and the sanitation of food, employing food-contact approved disinfecting agents (e.g., sodium hypochlorite, and hydrogen peroxide).

2.2. Airborne transmission and contribution of atmospheric particulate {#sec2.2}
----------------------------------------------------------------------

COVID-19 airborne spread has recently been reported by on-field studies conducted at Wuhan Hospitals: RNA of SARS-COV-2 RNA was retrieved in air samples collected in the hospitals wards and outside hospital buildings, in lower quantities in the outdoor samples, compared to indoor ([@bib41]; [@bib29]). Based on available outcomes, air should be considered a major route of transmission, especially considering certain aerosol-generating procedures performed in health care facilities. The potential airborne diffusion of the virus, enhancing the importance of adopting isolation measures, has been also evaluated by two recent studies conducted at two hospitals in Wuhan (China), in at-risk hospital wards and in public areas ([@bib19]), and at the University of Nebraska Medical Center (Omaha, USA) ([@bib26]), during the COVID-19 spread in February 2020. Collected samples were aerosols, and total suspended particles. The persistance of SARS-CoV-2 in the air was evidenced in Wuhan Hospital wards along the COVID-19 outbreak (from 1 to 113 copies/m^3^), although the virus was not detected following the reduction of affected patients and the application of more rigorous disinfecting procedures; public spaces outside Wuhan hospitals reported the airborn presence of the virus when high number people were present ([@bib19]). The study conducted at University of Nebraska Medical Center reported the 63.2% positivity from the analyzed samples, ranging from 2 to 9 copies/L ([@bib26]).

Based on the studies regarding the viruses spreading in the population, the available literature often linked the incidence of viral infections cases with the concentrations of atmospheric polluting particulate matter (e.g., PM~10~ e PM~2.5~) ([@bib5]; [@bib27]). Indeed, the atmospheric particulate act as a carrier, for the majority of chemical and biological contaminants, viruses included. A preliminary study, describing the possible relation, in Italy, between the COVID-19 diffusion and the exceeding of PM~10~ limit values, has been released in early 2020 ([@bib28]). The research aimed to evaluate the potential correlation between the atmospheric particulate pollution and the virus shedding. Following the collection of PM~10~ values in several italian cities (data available from Italian Regional Agencies for Health Protection, ARPA), and the identification of events of law limit values exceedings (50 μg/m^3^), data were associated to the numbers of COVID-19 affected population, reported by Italian Civil Protection authority: the hypothesis was confirmed by the registration of the highest number of Italian outbreaks in Po Valley (i.e., Pianura Padana), where the highest levels of pollution are reported yearly. The researchers therefore hypothesised a potential boosting effect of SARS-CoV-2 transmission, thanks to the vehiculation through the PM~10~ ([@bib28]). The hypothesis was confirmed by a research conducted by the same working group in Northern Italy, reporting the presence of SARS-CoV-2 viral RNA (using RT-PCR, detecting *E*, *N*, and *RdRP* genes) in over the 30% of the 34 PM~10~ specimens of airborne PM~10~ sampled in the industrial area around the city of Bergamo (Italy) ([@bib30]). The atmospheric persistence of SARS-CoV-2, whose quantity still need to be deeply investigated, would amplify the risk of contracting COVID-19, making necessary periodic air monitoring, to assess the transmission risk of the virus in the most exposed environments.

2.3. Survival of *Coronavirus* in water, and wastewater effluents {#sec2.3}
-----------------------------------------------------------------

The risk of respiratory syndromes onset and the potential environmental transmission indicates the need to collect more detailed information concerning the survival of species of *Coronavirus* genus in water environments. The survival of surrogate species of *Coronavirus*, Human *Coronavirus* 229E (HCoV), Feline Infectious Peritonitis Virus (FIPV), and *Poliovirus* 1 (PV-1), was analyzed in filtered and unfiltered tap water, and in wastewater. The evaluation on filtered tap water (beyond unfiltered samples) resulted functional to the reduction of the influence coming from the bacteria and the organic matter present in the wastewater effluent, that may inhibit the replication of the viruses under analysis ([@bib15]).

Results were presented in a study conducted in 2008. The inactivation of *Coronavirus* in water results strongly depending on the temperature, the levels of organic matter, and the presence of antagonists germs, such as *Escherichia coli*, *Enterococcus* spp., *Bacillus* spp., *Clostridium* spp., etc. (generally isolated from wastewater). To reach inactivation rates of 99,9% (T~99.9~) viral load in tap water, at 23 °C, 10 days are needed; at 4 °C, the viral surrogate of SARS-CoV-2 is capable of surviving up to 588 days, considering projected values ([Table 1](#tbl1){ref-type="table"} ) ([@bib15]).Table 1Survival, expressed in days, of different viruses in filtered tap water, stored at 23 °C and 4 °C. Tested viral strains: Human *Coronavirus* 229E (HCoV), Feline Infectious Peritonitis Virus (FIPV), Poliovirus 1 (PV-1). The time, in days, of viral load decrease, is expressed based on the decrease rate of 99% (T~99~) and 99,9% (T~99.9~) ([@bib15]).Table 1VirusTap water filtered\
23 °C \[days\]Tap water filtered\
4 °C \[days\]T~99~T~99.9~T~99~T~99.9~Human *Coronavirus* 229E (HCov)6.766.76392588Feline Infectious Peritonitis Virus (FIPV)6.766.7687.0130Poliovirus 1 (PV-1)43.343.3135203

The time required to inactivate the virus in wastewater plant effluents at a 99,9% rate (T~99.9~) shows the rapid die off of the *Coronavirus* at 23 °C, from 2.3 to 3.5 days ([Table 2](#tbl2){ref-type="table"} ), registering a mean reduction \> 3 log~10~ in 3 days. *Poliovirus* 1 is able to survive for longer time, compared to *Coronavirus* ([@bib15]).Table 2Survival, in days, of different viral strains in wastewater (i.e., wastewater treatment plants effluents, at 23 °C. Tested viral strains: Human *Coronavirus* 229E (HCoV), Feline Infectious Peritonitis Virus (FIPV), Poliovirus 1 (PV-1). The time, in days, of viral load decrease, is expressed based on the decrease rate of 99% (T~99~) and 99,9% (T~99.9~) ([@bib15]).Table 2VirusPrimary effluent filtered 23 °C \[days\]Primary effluent unfiltered 23 °C \[days\]Secondary effluent 23 °C \[days\]T~99~T~99.9~T~99~T~99.9~T~99~T~99.9~Human *Coronavirus* 229E (HCov)1.572.352.363.541.852.77Feline Infectious Peritonitis Virus (FIPV)1.602.401.712.561.622.42*Poliovirus* 1 (PV-1)23.635.57.2710.93.835.74Table 3Persistence of the two main SARS-CoV-2 surrogates (HCoV 229E and SARS-CoV) on different types of inanimate surfaces. Reference to the studies are available in the original article ([@bib18]).Table 3Type of surfaceVirus strainViral TitreTemperaturePersistenceAluminiumHCoV 229E and OC4310^3^-5x10^3^21 °C2--8 hMetalSARS-CoV P910^5^Room Temperature5 daysWoodSARS-CoV P910^5^Room Temperature4 daysPaperSARS-CoV GVU6109 and P910^5^--10^6^Room Temperature3 h to 5 daysGlassSARS-CoV P910^3^--10^6^Room Temperature2--5 daysPlasticSARS-CoV FFM1, HKU39849, and P910^3^--10^7^20--25 °C2--5 daysPVCHCoV 229E10^3^21 °C5 daysSilicon rubberHCoV 229E10^3^21 °C5 daysSurgical glove (latex)HCoV 229E and OC435 × 10^3^21 °C≤8 hDisposable gownSARS-CoV GVU610910^3^--10^6^Room Temperature1 h to 2 daysCeramicHCoV 229E10^3^21 °C5 daysTeflonHCoV 229E10^3^21 °C5 days

The research performed by Gundy et al., in 2009 indeed reported how the transmission risk of strains from *Coronavirus* genus could be less probable, with respects to Enteroviruses in water environments, because of the faster inactivation process of *Coronavirus* in wastewater at ambient temperatures.

2.4. SARS-CoV-2 in civil, hospital, and industrial wastewater {#sec2.4}
-------------------------------------------------------------

Wastewater may potentially contain a certain concentration of the *Coronavirus*, beyond enteric viruses; the sludge deriving from wastewater treatment plants, and class B bio-solids, for examples, was demonstrated containing *Coronavirus* genes in more than 80% of the examined samples ([@bib35]). However, whether the SARS-CoV-2 is active in the above mentioned environmental, allowing either fecal or oral transmission has not been yet clarified. Studies on the persistance of *Coronavirus* in water ([@bib15]; [@bib2]) underlined the strong inhibiting effect on the virus survival, given by the temperature parameter. The composition of the water, included the presence of microorganisms, together with proteins, is able to highly influence virus survival (non sterilized wastewater allowed an lower survival of *Poliovirus* 1 and HAV), although the viral survival is highly reduced with temperatures \> 20 °C. It was demonstrated that surrogate viruses in sterilized wastewater (autoclaved at 121 °C for 30 min) are inactivated with different rates, compared to those tested in non-sterilized wastewater ([@bib21]). Based on the same experimental protocol, the study demonstrated that *Coronavirus* surrogates are able to survive longer in non-filtered primary effluents, compared to filtered samples ([@bib15]). The increased survival rate in presence of sediments or organic matter may be due to the protection that such components offer towards chemical or biological inactivating agents in the water. The presence of exogenous material is indeed capable of causing a rapid viral inactivation, as demonstrated in a study by [@bib2], evaluating the persistance of *Coronavirus* in pasteurized sludge, compared to the viral survival in distilled water. Based on the collected data, the effects of the matrix on the inactivation of the viral load result complex, and highly variable from a viral strain to another, and from sample to sample. SARS-CoV, for example, has been demonstrated to lose infectivity in vitro in culture media earlier than Human *Coronavirus* 229E (H--CoV 229E), considering the same conditions ([@bib24]; [@bib35]). The available studies on surrogate SARS-COV-2 viruses suggest to suppose that the novel *Coronavirus* may be less persistant in wastewater, mainly due to the presence of either organic matter, or inhibiting matrix autochtonous flora: such factors are indeed able to activate metabolic pathways causing the faster die-off of the viruses. The extreme infectiousness of SARS-CoV-2 led many countries to suggest a monitoring of wastewater in order to evaluate the presence of the virus in the community, mainly to extimate the asymptomatic individuals, and aiming to quantify the potential infection risks for wastewater and solid waste plants' employees ([@bib34]). The persistance of SARS-CoV-2 was recently evaluated in wastewater at the Amsterdam Schiphol Airport (Tilburg, Netherlands) and at the wastewater treatment plant in Kaatsheuvel (Netherlands), collecting samples weekly, from February to March 2020. The quantitative monitoring of the virus, brought out the detection of the new *Coronavirus* in the airport wastewater and in the wastewater treatment plant samples collected in March 2020. The monitoring resulted crucial, allowing to associating the presence of the SARS-CoV-2 and the occurrence and registration of the first COVID-19 cases in Netherlands. The genetic material from the virus was indeed detected in wastewater samples taken from the wastewater treatment plants starting from March 2020, while the first official COVID-19 cases in Netherlands were registered on February 27th, 2020 ([@bib25]; [@bib12]; [@bib20]) the outcomes, considering the mean SARS-COV-2 incubation period between 2 and 11 days, up to a maximum of 14 days ([@bib6]), consent to hypothesize that the first cases of COVID-19 in Netherlands may be actually placed in the time period reported by Netherland Health authorities.

In 2005, in China, Wang et al. 2020a, 2020b published the results of researches conducted to verify the presence of SARS-CoV in wastewater coming from two hospitals receiving patients affected with SARS. The outcomes reported that, following disinfection protocols (using chlorine), SARS-CoV RNA resulted still detectable from sewages from one of the hospitals involved in the monitoring. The study demonstrated that the virus is able to survive up to 2 days at 20 °C, and the inactivated viral RNA was isolated up to 8 days) ([@bib32]; [@bib33]). For this reason, it results essential to apply the adequate disinfection protocols in hospital facilities treating patients with *Coronavirus* syndromes (e.g. COVID-19), aiming to inactivate the virus (presumably persisting for the same time as SARS-CoV), containing the excessive spread in wastewater.

2.5. Sewage and bio-solids sludge viral persistance {#sec2.5}
---------------------------------------------------

SARS-CoV strains are generally able to survive up to 96 h in human biological specimens, such as faeces, sputum, and serum, but result a lot less stable in urine ([@bib7]), probably depending on the inhibiting pH values, and the presence of urea. The faecal excretions of SARS-CoV in the past decade represented a strong concern with respects to the security measures to be applied in order to assess the waste collection in the territory. Nevertheless, as of April 2020, no cases of SARS-CoV or SARS-CoV-2 infections transmitted via sewages or sludge were reported. Some studies performed on similar viruses such as Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), evaluating the persistance of the virus in such waste categories, for the time needed to consider the pathogen as a risk for human health, demonstrated that the risk is to be considered highly improbable. Moreover, it is difficult for the virus to survive to processing treatments to which waste is usually subject ([@bib36]; [@bib8]).

2.6. Measures to contain the shedding of the virus in the environment and on surfaces {#sec2.6}
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

From the beginning of the global diffusion of COVID-19, following the declaration of the pandemy by World Health Organization (WHO), the health authorities from all over the world issued useful guidelines to handle the emergency. For example, regarding waste treatment, WHO and U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), indicated the measures to assess COVID-19 issue, specifying that for this peculiar pathogenic agent no special precautions need to be implemented, beyond the measures already applied to guarantee employees safety ([@bib37]; [@bib31]). *Coronavirus* is indeed susceptible to the same disinfecting conditions employed in the sanitary system to handle the risk connected to the presence of any virus. For this reason, the disinfections protocols for the treatment of water, industrial and civil wastewater, and inanimate surfaces are considered adequate, as well as the personal protective equipment (PPE), if properly employed, that are generally used for the management of non treated waste ([@bib31]). The main disinfection treatments employed in water and wastewater treatment plants consist on oxidants products such as sodium hypochlorite, peracetic acid, and hydrogen peroxide; the UV light is also employed, although less effective towards virus ([@bib31]). The above mentioned disinfecting means should be optimal in SARS-COV-2 reduction and removal.

It can be hypothesised that the treatment plants collecting hospital wastewater are receiving sewage containing high concentration of the SARS-CoV-2 and, whether the virus inactivation treatments result inadequate, the risk of detecting high viral loads in the environment could come up ([@bib2]). As already premised, *Coronavirus* strains are usually less resistant to disinfection treatments, compared to other organisms which can be found in wastewater, such as *Escherichia coli* phage or human virus, such as *Poliovirus*, which, are commonly employed as surrogates for the evaluation of the efficacy of viruses inactivation ([@bib15]). Survival of *Coronavirus* strains is generally function of the temperature, showing a higher persistance at low temperatures: it may be therefore supposed that the persistance of SARS-CoV-2 in surface water and wastewater in the warm seasons may be highly reduced. In general, secondary treatments may result crucial for the logarithmic reduction of the virus (more than 90%) ([@bib16]; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, [@bib9]) despite the variability in the collected data supports the need to employ the preventive application of chemical disinfection protocols (e.g., chlorination), and the aid of UV light. The efficacy of chlorination, highly oxidating treatment, additionally depends on the presence, in the matrix that has to be treated, of peculiar substances such as the ammonia, which, reacting with sodium hypochlorite, brings to the formation of chloroammines, active principles less effective virucides than free chlorine. Available researches propose the chlorination of wastewater with a 10 mg/L dosage of sodium hypochlorite, with a 30 min time of contact, and a residual chlorine value \> 0.4 mg/L: the suggested disinfection methods resulted efficient to inactivate *Coronavirus* strains up to 5 log ([@bib32]). As for the disinfection using UV light, the health authorities did not specify viral inactivation protocols yet, considering that the lower inactivation efficacy of UV light, compared to the also cheaper chlorination ([@bib31]). As for the treatment of surfaces in industrial facilities (e.g., food companies, or the water, wastewater, and waste treatment plants), considering the evidences of the pathogenic viruses persistence on such inanimated matrices ([@bib18]), several researches showed the removal efficacy of the virus, by testing different biocidal products. The virus is successfully eliminated from surfaces using 65--70% ethanol (or isopropanol), 0.5% hydrogen peroxide or 0.1% sodium hypochlorite, with a time of contact of 1 min; further virucidal agents such as benzalkonium chloride (up to 0.2%) or chlorhexidine digluconate based products (0.02%) were demonstrated less active in the virus inactivation ([@bib18]). European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) published a list of the most effective biocides for SARS-CoV-2 disinfection ([@bib10]). World Health Organization (WHO) and the U. S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention recommended low environmental impact biocides, such as phenolic compounds, hydrogen peroxide, hydroalcoholic formulates, holding high efficacy towards the new *Coronavirus*, indicating the high susceptibility of the pathogen to the disinfecting agents used to inactivate enveloped viruses ([@bib38]; [@bib3]). For example, the biocide 2-phenylphenol, at a 0.2% concentration, is capable of breaking the viral membranes and denaturing the virus proteins ([@bib1]). Hydrogen peroxide was demonstrate extremely active in the inactivation of a wide range of viruses, comprised SARS-CoV-2 surrogates (e.g., Human Coronavirus 229E, H--CoV-229E; Trasmissible GatroEnreritis Virus, TGEV), holding a die-off capability \> 4 log~10~ of viral titre, in 1 min time of contact ([@bib18]; [@bib22]; [@bib4]; [@bib36]), additionally showing a low registered toxicity ([@bib22]). Hydrogen Peroxide Vapourized (HPV) was demonstrated inactivating \> 4 log~10~ viral titres of SARS-CoV-2 surrogates (feline *Calicivirus*, FCV; human *Adenovirus*-1, hADV-1; Trasmissible Gatroenreritis Virus, TGEV; etc.), at low percentages of the active principle (1400 ppm), reporting low toxicity on cells ([@bib14]). Hydrogen peroxide and 2-phenylphenol are generally employed also for food sanitation, and for surfaces disinfection, therefore representing valid alternatives to sodium hypochlorite.

3. Conclusion {#sec3}
=============

COVID-19 airborne transmission has not been yet demonstrated; fecal shedding has been reported from some patients, although the viability of the virus has been evidenced at low levels. Furthermore, based on the studies on surface water, wastewater, sludge and bio-solid waste, the survival of SARS-CoV-2 would result very low with temperatures higher than 20 °C, and the inactivation rate of *Coronavirus* is usually higher than other examined viruses. The same consideration could be made for the risk coming from potentially contaminated food, for which *Coronavirus* persistance was reported for not more than 72 h of storage at 4 °C. On inanimate surfaces, strains of *Coronavirus* genus are capable to surviving up to nine days, but result extremely labile, being inactivated with really low concentrations of disinfectants.

Certainly, a prolonged exposure to contaminated environmental sources, such as the exploitation of air pollutants (e.g., PM~10~), the extended contact with aerosols produced from wastewater and surface water plants treatment, the inadequate detergency processes of food and surfaces, may potentially lead to an augmented transmission risk, also in non immunocompromised individuals. Therefore, the proper employment, from employees of health system, water, and waste treatment plants, and industries in general, of the appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE), especially masks equipped with filters, along the production chain, the low survival of SARS-CoV-2 in environmental conditions, and the adequate application of disinfection treatments foreseen by national and international guidelines, allow to suppose that the risk linked to the transmission of the virus may result low.
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